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Abstract
The proposed Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 recommended personal reemployment
accounts (PRAs) that would provide each eligible unemployment insurance (UI) claimant with a
special account of up to $3,000 to finance reemployment activities. Account funds could be used to
purchase intensive, supportive, and job training services. Any funds remaining in the PRA could be
paid as a cash bonus for reemployment within 13 weeks, or drawn as extended income maintenance
for exhaustees of regular UI benefits. Personal reemployment account offers would be targeted  to
UI beneficiaries most likely to exhaust their UI entitlements using state Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) models. The draft legislation called for a budget of $3.6 billion
for PRAs, with the money to be committed over a two-year period. This report provides a simulation
analysis of questions relevant to implementation of PRAs by states. The analysis is done using data
for the state of Georgia. Simulations rely on recent patterns of intensive, supportive, and training
services use. Simulations for alternative rules setting the PRA amount and varying behavioral
responses are examined. Like the legislative proposal, simulated PRA offers are targeted using
WPRS models. The key question examined is, how many PRA offers can a state make given a fixed
budget? Proposed and alternative rules for substate budget allocation are also examined. The
framework presented in this paper allows the exploration of several behavioral responses to
incentives created by the PRA.
iEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Proposed legislation called the Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 introduced a new model
for customer choice among publicly funded reemployment services. The Bush administration
recommended a two-year federal budget of $3.6 billion to provide each eligible unemployment
insurance (UI) claimant a personal reemployment account (PRA) of up to $3,000. Personal
reemployment account funds could be used for three things: 1) to purchase reemployment services,
2) as a reemployment bonus, and 3) as extended income maintenance for exhaustees of regular UI
benefits. Personal reemployment account offers would be targeted  to UI beneficiaries most likely
to exhaust their UI entitlements using state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS)
models.  
If PRAs are enacted, core services at one-stop career centers would remain free to all
customers, but PRA recipients wishing to use intensive, supportive, and job training services would
be required to use account funds to purchase them from a qualified public or private vendor.
Additionally, PRA recipients who return to work within 13 weeks of their UI claim date may receive
the unused balance in the PRA as a cash reemployment bonus. Sixty percent of the balance would
be paid upon reemployment with the remainder payable after six months steady employment. Those
failing to gain reemployment and exhausting regular UI entitlement could draw support payments
from their PRAs at the rate of their weekly benefit amounts (WBAs).  
The PRA proposal combines several employment initiatives in an innovative way, but
legislation authorizing PRAs has not yet been enacted. However, the proposal remains active and
has the president’s continued support. The W.E. Upjohn Institute has investigated aspects of how
the proposed PRAs would work under a grant from the U.S. Department of Labor. The Institute
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conducted PRA simulation analyses using a unique data set for the state of Georgia linking UI
claims and employment services records. To be forward looking, our simulations used the new
WPRS model now being implemented in Georgia.  
PRA Budgets and Service Prices
The proposed $3.6 billion for PRA enrollments over two years requires that funds be
distributed to states in proportion to their share of national unemployment. Based on 2002
unemployment figures, Georgia’s share would be 2.37 percent, or $85.32 million.  The proposal also
requires that PRA funds be allocated within states in proportion to regional shares of state
unemployment. Given that offers are to be targeted using WPRS scores to those most likely to
exhaust their benefit entitlements, nearly all offers would be made to UI claimants in the top 30
percent of the state WPRS distribution of claimant scores. Consequently, we focus our simulations
on that group of claimants. 
Since the simulation analysis required monetary values for services, hypothetical prices were
set based on statewide service expenditures, service usage rates, and relative valuations for services.
Based on our sample for analysis, Table E.1 summarizes imputed prices for services as well as usage
rates during the two PRA relevant time periods: the first 13 weeks and the remaining 39 weeks in
the UI benefit year. In addition to supportive and training services, Georgia one-stop centers offer
five types of intensive services. The most popular intensive services among those potentially eligible
for a PRA are customer service plan and counseling. The table shows that among those profiled,
18.9 and 20.3 percent of claimants used these services, respectively, during the first 13 weeks. The
table further shows that the bulk of service use occurs in that earlier time frame. Relatively small
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proportions of UI claimants use either supportive or training services, which are imputed to be most
costly.
PRA Simulations
Our simulations focus on estimating the average expected cost per $3,000 PRA offer, and
the number of offers possible over two years given the budget. Estimates of these magnitudes are
critical for states planning for PRA enrollment over a two-year cycle. The simulations also provide
evidence on the pattern of service use, bonus receipt, and income maintenance payments likely to
result under PRAs.  
To span the range of possible responses to PRA offers, our simulations include a baseline
of no change in behavior regarding service use and UI benefit receipt, as well as impacts shortening
UI duration by 1 and 2 weeks. These alternatives encompass the range of responses observed in the
UI reemployment bonus experiments (Robins and Spiegelman 2001). The simulation grants a first
bonus payment for UI duration of less than 13 weeks, and a second bonus payment when there are
also positive earnings in the first and third quarters following the claim and at least $2,000 in
earnings the second quarter. Under the proposal, a second bonus is not paid if reemployment
services are purchased after a first bonus payment. Table E.2 shows that for the baseline simulation,
26.7 percent of the sample could be paid both bonuses—provided funds remained in the PRA after
purchase of services—while a total of 40.2 percent of those potentially offered a bonus appear to
qualify for a first bonus payment. Since they did not gain employment during the first 13 weeks,
58.8 percent of the sample would not qualify for either bonus but could use PRA funds for services
or income support payments after benefit exhaustion. 
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If every UI claimant offered a PRA accepted, and every recipient spent the entire $3,000
grant, then 28,440 offers could be made over two years with the Georgia budget of $85.32  million.
However, it is unlikely that all account recipients will spend their entire grants. Table E.3
summarizes the average cost per offer given the prices and usage pattern for services observed in
Georgia. Since there is uncertainty about what elements of PRAs may emerge from current
deliberations or future proposals, the table presents results for three combinations: 1) bonus,
purchase of services, and exhaustee payments; 2) bonus and purchase of services; and 3) bonus only
with free services.  
The Average Cost of PRA Offers
The top row of Table E.3 reports that offers with all three elements would cost an average
of $2,475 in the absence of any behavioral response. If durations for those offered PRAs are 1 week
shorter, the average cost per offer rises by $40; if the response is 2 weeks the cost rises by $76 per
offer from the baseline. The increased cost results from more beneficiaries becoming employed soon
enough to qualify for bonus payments. The average cost increases resulting from responses to the
PRA offer are modest.
If the extended jobless benefits feature of PRAs is eliminated, the average baseline cost of
a $3,000 account drops more than $1,000 to $1,452. Accounting for 1- and 2-week behavioral
responses increases the average cost by $39 and $76, respectively.   
The bottom row of Table E.3 shows costs associated with simplified PRAs involving only
a targeted reemployment bonus. Simulations for Georgia indicate the baseline $3,000 bonus offer
would cost $1,040 in payments, and if insured durations declined by 1 or 2 weeks the costs would
vrise by $46 and $91, respectively. Previous analysis of targeted reemployment bonuses suggested
that cash offers as large as $3,000 would not be cost effective, but smaller offers could be cost
effective  while still encouraging quicker return to work (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner
forthcoming).
The Number of PRA Offers Possible
Table E.4 translates the PRA average cost figures into estimates of the number of offers that
could be made assuming 100 percent acceptance of PRA offers. An 80 percent acceptance rate was
observed in the Illinois bonus experiment, which required a formal acceptance of the offer
(Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). Assuming that acceptance is not correlated with factors
systematically influencing the rate of spending from PRAs, enrollment estimates could be adjusted
by a factor equal to the reciprocal of the take-up rate. Our simulations indicate that the baseline PRA
with all three elements could be offered to 34,473 Georgia UI claimants over two years. That is
about 17,000 per year, or about 6.3 percent of Georgia UI claimants based on 2001 data. The PRA
proposal targets WPRS profiled claimants most likely to exhaust benefits who are initially eligible
for at least 20 weeks of benefits, and 17,000 offers constitute about 13 percent of this target group
in Georgia.  Even with a 1- or 2-week behavioral response, the Georgia budget would permit nearly
17,000 offers per year.  
If the PRA included only the bonus and purchase of services, not the extended benefits
feature, more than 31,000 offers per year could be made with the Georgia budget regardless of the
behavioral response. For offers that were simply $3,000 targeted bonuses, more than 43,000 offers
per year could be made with the PRA grant to Georgia.  
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Additional Program Design Considerations
Our simulation results are very robust relative to the assumed service prices. Cutting service
prices in half would increase the number of offers possible by only about 20 percent. However, there
is uncertainty about how charging for services would affect the pattern of services chosen. 
Under what conditions would a PRA recipient either purchase services or take their chances
and pursue bonus payments? To investigate this question, we identified the reemployment outcomes
that would make a participant financially indifferent toward the following two extremes: 1)
purchasing no services with the hope of receiving the full PRA amount in bonus payments, or 2)
spending the entire PRA amount to purchase services with the hope of speeding up reemployment
or receiving a higher reemployment wage. To spend the entire budget on services, the UI beneficiary
must expect either earnings to be nearly 14 percent higher or that employment will occur at least 6
weeks sooner. Research on employment and earnings effects of employment services and job
training suggests effects are more modest (Leigh 1995). PRA recipients might therefore reduce use
of services in hopes of receiving larger reemployment bonuses.  
We also checked to see if $3,000 would be sufficient to purchase the bundles of services
chosen given the assumed prices. If no PRA money was spent on bonuses and all on services, about
one-half of 1 percent of the UI claimants in our Georgia sample would have a budget shortfall.
Among these claimants the mean budget shortfall was $551 in the first 13 weeks and $637 during
the remainder of the UI benefit year.  
The PRA proposal requires that the amount of the PRA be uniform throughout the state and
not exceed $3,000. Since the UI reemployment experiments set bonus offers as multiples of the
WBA we simulated setting PRAs as 10 times the WBA, with a minimum of $1,500. The maximum
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WBA in Georgia is $300. This design would permit about 15 percent more bonus offers, and it also
may moderate the incentive for some claimants to accept low-paying jobs simply to qualify for the
first bonus paid upon reemployment.  
The UI reemployment experiments paid bonuses only after at least 16 weeks of continuous
reemployment. In these experiments, the reemployment earnings of those offered bonuses were at
least as high as the control groups. The timing of bonus payments under the proposed PRAs might
yield a different impact on wages.  
The proposed formula for PRA budget allocations to states and local service delivery regions
within states is determined by the estimated share of unemployment. This formula will yield a
disproportionate share of PRA dollars to qualified UI claimants in states with relatively exclusionary
UI eligibility conditions. The total unemployment rate exceeds the insured unemployment rate by
a greater margin in such areas. Since PRAs are only offered to UI claimants, the allocation could
more equitably be based on the state and local share of insured unemployment. Changing the
allocation rule to be based on insured unemployment would not penalize states that have higher
rates. 
 
Summary
Economists have long touted the merits of incentives, pricing, and targeting in social
programs, particularly reemployment programs. These features have been tried in demonstration
programs and some are now used in Individual Training Accounts and the WPRS system. However,
all three features previously have not been combined in the same program. Simulations suggest that
successful implementation of such a program requires an understanding of the possible responses
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by participants. Simulations also point to the range of behavioral responses necessary for PRAs to
funtion well. While findings from past studies indicate that measured responses to reemployment
bonuses and expected wage gains from services fall short of what is necessary for participants to
choose services over the bonus, final assessment of PRAs awaits implementation or demonstration
of the program.
Table E.1 Estimated Services Usage Rates and Prices for Intensive, Supportive, and Training
Services among WPRS Profiled UI Claimants in Georgia, Program Year 2001
Services Up to 13 weeks
(%)
After 13 weeks
(%)
Hypothetical prices
($)
Intensive services
Service coordination 0.5 0.2 356
Customer service plan 18.9 4.6 356
In-Depth assessment 0.1 0.0 712
Counseling 20.3 5.1 712
Expanded workshop 0.4 0.3 712
Supportive services 1.7 0.6 1,068
Training services 2.7 1.8 1,424
Table E.2 Sample Percentages by Employment Status in PRA Time Periods among
Recipients Profiled to be Most Likely to Exhaust UI Benefits
Employed in 
first 13 weeks
Employed after 13 weeks
Yes No
Yes 26.7 13.5
No 9.9 49.9
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Table E.3  Average Cost per PRA Offer for Alternative Combinations of Features ($)
PRA scenario Baseline 1-week impact 2-week impact
Bonus, purchase services, and
   UI exhaustee payments 2,475 2,515 2,551
Bonus and purchase services 1,452 1,491 1,528
Bonus only with free services 1,040 1,086 1,131
Table E.4 Number of PRA Offers Possible in Georgia over Two Years for Alternative
Combinations of Features Assuming All Offers Are Accepted
PRA scenario Baseline 1-week impact 2-week impact
Bonus, purchase services, and
   UI exhaustee payments 34,473 33,924 33,446
Bonus and purchase services 65,149 63,538 62,111
Bonus only with free services 93,403 89,473 85,929
1http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:h.r.444: (accessed November 24, 2004).
2http://edworkforce.house.gov/press/press108/03mar/wiapc032703.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).  
3http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030617-3.html (accessed October 12, 2003).  
1. Introduction
In January 2003, Congress introduced draft legislation for the Back to Work Incentive Act
of 2003 that proposed a new way to help dislocated workers become reemployed.1 Under this
approach, each eligible unemployment insurance (UI) claimant would be offered a personal
reemployment account (PRA) of up to $3,000. Funds in the PRA could be used for three things: 1)
to purchase reemployment services, 2) as a reemployment bonus, and 3) as continued income
support after exhaustion of the regular UI entitlement. PRA offers were to be targeted to claimants
most likely to exhaust UI by state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) models.
The draft legislation proposed a budget of $3.6 billion, with the money to be committed over
a two-year period and all disbursements from PRAs completed within three years from the start date.
Funds were to be allocated among states according to each state’s share of national unemployment.
By this rule the Georgia budget allocation would be $85.3 million. The proposal also requires
within-state allocations to be based on the same criterion. Since PRA offers must be targeted using
WPRS profiling scores, this raises particular challenges for states planning for implementation. 
The Back to Work Incentive Act did not become law, but the provisions for PRAs were
added to the proposal for reauthorization of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). “Due to
uncertainty relating to the outcome of House-Senate negotiations on the FY 2004 Budget
Resolution,” in March 2003 PRAs were removed from WIA reauthorization legislation known as
the Workforce Reinvestment and Adult Education Act of 2003.2 Nonetheless, the administration
continues to advocate the creation of PRAs.3 So states must be prepared to act quickly.  
2Effective implementation of PRAs requires advance planning, monitoring of the use of funds
by early PRA enrollees, and adjustment of state PRA plans during the course of enrollment. Critical
participant response parameters include rates of PRA offer acceptance, intensive and training service
use rates, the rate of qualification for first bonus payments, and the rate of qualification for second
bonus payment. Cost data for intensive and training services are also required for planning and
implementation of PRAs. 
This paper examines issues relating to PRA implementation based on simulations performed
using administrative data provided by the state of Georgia. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research investigated these questions under a grant from the U.S. Department of
Labor. The data from Georgia constitute a rare sample linking UI claims and employment services
records. To be forward looking, our simulations used the new WPRS model now being implemented
in Georgia.  
The next section provides an overview of how PRAs would work as proposed by HR 444
in January, 2003. Section 3 lays the foundation for simulation analysis of PRAs by examining the
pattern of service use in our sample for analysis. Section 4 estimates prices for intensive, supportive,
and training services as a basis for simulation. Section 5 gives a conceptual framework for PRA
simulations by providing a theoretical model of choice under PRAs. Section 6 partitions the PRA
eligible UI claimants into groups based on their pattern of UI benefit receipt and service usage. 
Section 7 presents statewide PRA simulation results. Section 8 presents a stark example of the
choice between buying services and receiving bonus payments under the PRA. Section 9 examines
substate budget allocation alternatives. The final section presents a summary and suggests some
extensions for the simulation analysis.  
32. PRAs Under HR 444
The proposed PRA combines several innovative features. Each has been tried separately
before, but no previous program or demonstration project has brought them all together in quite the
same way. The first novel component of the PRA is the requirement that participants directly pay
for intensive and training services. Employment services provided by one-stop career centers under
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) are divided into three levels: core, intensive, and training.
Services within each level are characterized by the amount of staff involvement and the extent to
which customers can access the service independently. Core services typically have the broadest
access and the least staff involvement of the three categories. Many core services are accessible on
a self-serve basis. 
Intensive services require a greater level of staff involvement and, consequently, access is
more limited than for core services. Services within the intensive category include individual and
group counseling, case management, aptitude and skill proficiency testing, job finding clubs,
creation of a job search plan, and career planning. Training services, the third and highest level of
service intensity, are usually available to customers only through referrals. 
Core services are free for everyone, intensive and training services are free to the general
public, but PRA recipients would be required to pay for such services. Service providers would
determine the fees to charge. PRA recipients would choose whether or not to purchase such services
and whether to purchase the services from public or private providers. Therefore, service providers
are faced with determining prices and with understanding how those prices may affect the demand
for their services. Some evidence about customer behavior in such an environment is being provided
by the individual training account evaluation (Decker and Perez-Johnson forthcoming). 
4The second component is the bonus payment. Under the PRA, UI claimants would be given
lump-sum payments from their accounts if they return to work within a specified time period. The
purpose of the bonus is to provide an incentive for dislocated workers to return to work as quickly
as possible. A bonus incentive system has been incorporated in several demonstration projects
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, but it has never been put in practice on a statewide or
programwide basis. Based upon evaluations of these demonstration projects, we expect that a bonus,
if of sufficient size relative to a claimant’s weekly benefit amount (WBA), will shorten the average
duration of UI compensated unemployment by as much as a week (Robins and Spiegelman 2001).
PRA account recipients who become reemployed within 13 weeks of their UI claim date
would be paid 60 percent of their PRA account balance upon reemployment. The remaining 40
percent would be paid six months later if employment is maintained and no additional services are
purchased. 
The third possible use of PRA funds permits UI benefit year recipients who exhaust their
regular benefit entitlements to draw funds from their PRAs at the rate of their WBA. This PRA
feature would act like an extended UI benefits program, and as does the availability of those
programs, it introduces the risk of prolonging unemployment durations (Woodbury and Rubin 1997).
 The PRA proposal requires that offers be targeted to UI claimants who are most likely to
exhaust their regular UI benefits, and that WPRS models be used to target offers (O’Leary, Decker,
and Wandner forthcoming). The WPRS system evaluates the exhaustion likelihood of UI claimants
who are neither union hiring hall members, nor on employer standby awaiting recall to their
previous job on a definite date. Such claimants are not expected to conduct an independent job
search while receiving benefits. PRAs would be offered to claimants with a high profiling score, and
5who are eligible for at least 20 weeks of UI benefits. Given that offers are to be targeted using
WPRS scores to those most likely to exhaust their benefit entitlement, nearly all offers would be
made to UI claimants in the top 30 percent of the state WPRS distribution of claimant scores.
Consequently, we focus our simulation analysis on that group of claimants. 
3. The Sample and Services Chosen
The data used to simulate implementation of PRAs in Georgia were originally provided for
work on the Frontline Decision Support System (FDSS) (Eberts and O’Leary 2002). The data record
participation in intensive, supportive, and training services were provided by Georgia Career
Centers.  Claimant information includes UI benefit entitlement, WBA, total benefit payments,
limited demographic information, and quarterly UI wage records. The wage record data provides
a way to examine the employment history of each UI beneficiary.
Complete benefit year data were drawn on all observations entering the system for UI claims
during the period January 1, 1996, through September 30, 2001. As summarized in Table 1, these
data included 851,054 observations. To focus on UI claims activity and service use since the start
of WIA implementation and one-stop career center operations, we restricted our UI claim inflow
period to the five quarters available after July 1, 2000. This yielded a sample size of 318,837. 
Since PRA offers are to be made to claimants near the top end of the distribution of WPRS
profiling scores, we restricted our analysis to the 232,617 claimants assigned a profiling score in
Georgia during our inflow period. This implicitly excludes those with a definite recall date and
members of union hiring halls; members of these groups are not expected to conduct an independent
job search to maintain UI benefit eligibility. An additional PRA eligibility condition is that claimants
4Our count of training service participants is the sum of referrals to training and formal WIA training
registrations, correcting for any double counting. The widespread use of Hope grants and scholarships in Georgia funded
by the state lottery probably results in lower observed training participation rates for Georgia than are typical in other
states. However, Georgia has significant levels of training, and the Hope money permits WIA funds to be used more
aggressively for supportive and intensive services.    
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must be initially eligible for at least 20 weeks of benefits. Imposing this condition reduces the
sample size to 156,220. A handful of other observations were excluded to assure complete data on
all variables needed for analysis. A sample of 156,181 observations was used in this analysis.
For our analysis sample of 156,181 the pattern of service use is summarized in Table 2,
which shows the use of intensive, supportive, and training services that would be paid for out of the
PRA.4 The number of participants and the participation rate are split into two time periods: the first
13 weeks of claims, and the weeks in the benefit year remaining after 13 weeks. The most popular
services in both periods are customer service plan and counseling, with 18.86 percent, respectively,
and 20.31 percent of profiled claimants using these services in the first period and 4.6 and 5.1
percent, respectively in the second period. 
Table 3 expands on Table 2 by adding additional rows at the bottom showing the use of core
services that are free to all customers regardless of whether or not they are granted a PRA. Among
the core services, in the first 13 weeks specific labor market information (LMI) is the most popular,
with 72.54 percent using this service. Other popular core services for this group are job order search
(54.18%) and service needs evaluation (41.61%). Near the bottom of Table 3, the service with
variable name C20 described as REU/Profiled had 30.21 percent of profiled claimants participating
in the first 13 weeks. This is the WPRS referral indicator showing a claimant was sent to the
reemployment unit (REU) for profiling reemployment services. Of those referred to WPRS, about
5Claimants referred to WPRS reemployment services can be excused if they have a definite date to report to
work.  They may also be excused because of illness, injury, or to care for dependent children, however in these cases
UI benefit entitlement is suspended because of failure to satisfy the “able and available” continuing UI eligibility
requirements.  
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25 percent were excused after reporting.5 Georgia has a state-based program similar to WPRS, called
the Claimant Assistance Program (CAP). CAP is the Georgia UI eligibility review program (ERP),
which requires periodic visits to a Georgia Career Center for services by those who continuously
remain on a UI benefit claim. More than 37 percent of claimants in our analysis sample were
referred to the REU because of selection through either WPRS, CAP, or both programs.  
Table 4 presents service use data in the first 13 weeks and remainder of the benefit year for
the top 30 percent of the WPRS distribution. This is the strata of claimants most likely to be offered
a PRA. Use of the intensive services Customer Service Plan and Counseling are higher for this
targeted group, with 31.7 and 33.3 percent of profiled claimants using these services in the first
period and 7.8 and 8.4 percent, respectively, in the second period. The core services information
shows that 69.84 percent of these claimants near the top of the predicted exhaustion distribution
were sent to the REU. Referral to services by the WPRS mechanism probably explains the higher
use rate of intensive services.  It is this targeted sample on which we conducted simulation analysis
of PRAs.
4. Prices for Services
Under the proposed PRA legislation, states must charge those UI beneficiaries who accept
a PRA offer for receiving intensive, supportive, and training services. States must also deduct the
cost of services used from the individual’s PRA balance before any cash bonus is determined.
Therefore, states must set prices for services. Information on service costs, which could be used as
6http://www.doleta.gov/usworkforce/performance/State_1-Page_AR_Summaries/georgia.xls (accessed
September 25, 2003).
7Many of the core and intensive services provided to UI claimants are financed by Wagner-Peyser grants to the
state Employment Service. Our approach is simply to use the shares of participants in intensive, supportive, and training
services to decompose the WIA grant.  
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a basis for service prices, is not readily available. The only commonly published WIA service cost
data are total expenditures by state. These state reports are part of the WIA performance
measurement system, and they include data on the number of WIA participants in the program year.
Average costs per participant can therefore be computed for services overall. However, the average
cost of the separate categories of intensive, supportive, and training services is not available. 
The simulations presented in this report are based on Georgia UI claimants entering the
system between July 1, 2000, and September 30, 2001. This is the first five quarters of WIA
program operation. We therefore use WIA cost data for the 2001 program year (PY) as the basic data
for service cost prices. In that year, WIA program expenditures in Georgia were $56.4 million, and
average per participant costs were $3,140.6 These participants included adults, youth, and dislocated
workers enrolled in WIA programs delivering training, intensive, and core services.
To perform PRA simulations we need estimates of average costs for separate intensive,
supportive, and training services. We therefore decompose the WIA grant by the proportions of
customers using each type of service statewide in our sample of UI claimants.7 Our computations
are based only on claimants who would be eligible for a PRA under the rules of the original HR 444
proposal. That is, those with a profiling score (meaning they were neither union hiring hall members,
nor waiting employer recall) and having 20 or more weeks of UI entitlement. Additionally, we
required that complete UI wage records be available.  
The computations leading to our service prices are summarized in Table 5, which also reports
the use of intensive, supportive, and training services by the 156,181 UI claimants in the sample.
8Based on advice from Georgia Department of Labor field Career Center staff, we count participation in a
service only once during the first 13 weeks of a claim, even if the data indicate multiple occurrences of the same code
in the time period. The same rule is applied for counting service participation after the first 13 weeks.  
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Georgia provides five types of intensive services: 1) service coordination, 2) customer service plan,
3) in-depth assessment, 4) counseling, and 5) expanded workshop. There are supportive services as
well. A total of 89,257 services were recorded for the claimants examined.8 The most popular
intensive services are customer service plan and counseling, with observed participation rates during
the first 13 weeks of claim being of 18.9 and 20.3 percent, respectively. A total of 7,024 training
services were received in the UI benefit year by claimants in our sample. For both intensive and
training services, the bulk of service inflows takes place during the first 13 weeks of the UI claim,
while for supportive services the majority is provided after 13 weeks into the claim.  
In the absence of hard data on service costs, based on informal discussions with one-stop
center staff in Georgia, we impose relative prices on the intensive and supportive services. Two
intensive services—service coordination and customer service plan—are assumed to have the lowest
cost, and they are assigned a single unit value, a type of numéraire for employment services. Twice
the unit value is assigned to the other three intensive services: in-depth assessment, counseling, and
expanded workshop. Supportive services per recipient are assumed to cost three times the unit value.
Finally, training services are priced at four times the unit value.
To arrive at our cost estimates, we split the total WIA budget among services based on the
number of participants and the relative value in comparison to the numéraire. There were 37,648
services with a unit value, 40,962 with twice the unit value, 3,623 with three times the unit value,
and 7,024 with four times the unit value. The resulting unit price for lower cost intensive services
is therefore $356 per participant, the higher cost intensive services average twice that or $712 per
participant. By this approach supportive services are estimated to cost $1,068 on average per
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participant. The remaining budget is evenly divided among the 7,024 training participants to arrive
at an average cost of $1,424 per participant. These average service cost prices are consistent with
the average service cost per participant of $3,140, since many service participants use more than one
service.  
5. A Choice Model for PRA Simulations
To design PRA simulations that are relevant for state administrators, it is useful to frame the
context of claimant choice by a decision model incorporating the variables governing choices
resulting in withdrawals from PRAs—employment and services use. We consider a simple two-
period model. The first period includes the first 13 weeks of a claimant’s benefit year. We proxy this
by the first 13 UI payments to a PRA participant. This period is the time frame within which a PRA
participant must find a job to qualify for a reemployment bonus payment. During this period, the
participant can engage in one or more of several activities. He or she can look for a job, find a job
(and thus be eligible for the bonus), receive core services, and purchase intensive, supportive, and
training services. The second period is the time span a person must remain employed (given that
they found a job in the first period) in order to collect the second part of the reemployment bonus.
During this period, a PRA participant can receive core services, purchase intensive, supportive, and
training services, continue with employment, find new or alternate employment, and exhaust
benefits. 
The choice to purchase services or engage in the other activities depends upon the expected
returns from those decisions. Therefore, we need to delineate the costs and benefits of each decision.
Costs include the out-of-pocket costs of purchasing intensive or supportive services (cs) and training
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services (cT), as well as the opportunity cost of spending time receiving services and engaging in
search efforts (cz). Benefits include the earnings received from working (w), the bonus payments
(b), and the UI benefits received (x). The future expected net benefits depend upon the choice of
services and the probability of finding employment.  
Therefore, a person in period one who accepts a PRA offer faces several combinations of
costs and benefits. For simplicity, we assume that the benefits from actions in a period accrue in the
same period. For example, if a person is employed in the first period the wages and the bonus are
received during that period. Similarly, the costs accrue in the period in which the actions take place.
Note that the wage may differ depending upon whether or not a person receives training. In addition
to increasing the likelihood of receiving a job offer, training may increase the reemployment wage
and increase the retention rate.
  From Figure 1, it is clear that a person’s decision to purchase services is complex and is
based on their own choices and the ability to find a job, which depends in part on the local economic
conditions. For example, the benefits accrued in the first period for those employed and choose to
purchase services depend upon several decisions. Since the bonus depends upon the amount of the
account left over after purchasing services (b1 – cs – cT), the first decision is how much of their PRA
account will they use to purchase intensive and training services? This decision, in turn, depends
upon the participant’s perception of how much these services will increase his or her probability of
finding and retaining a job. The probability of finding a job and the time it takes to become
reemployed and start to receive earnings will determine the amount of benefits (wages, bonus, and
UI benefits) the participants will receive that first period. Changing the cost of services and the
perception of the effectiveness of services may change the choices that PRA participants make.  
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6. PRA Participant Groups
UI claimants who accept a PRA will be faced with decisions to purchase services based on
the prices set and their employment prospects. Since we are not able to simulate what services would
be bought if customers were charged for them, we examine the pattern of service use observed under
the current WIA program, and assume as a first approximation that it would not change. In addition,
we delineate the service usage by different employment outcomes. This pattern mimics, to the extent
possible, the choices of services that UI claimants might make under different employment
situations. In reality, the patterns observed in the data are the result of both choices by UI claimants
and the referrals to services by program staff.  
Two time periods are relevant for decisions about spending on services from a PRA. The first
time period is based on the length of time within which an eligible UI claimant must find
employment in order to qualify for the first part of the cash bonus. Consequently, period one is the
first 13 weeks after a claim. The second period is based on the length of time the UI claimant must
maintain a job in order to qualify for the second bonus payment—26 weeks. In each of these two
periods a claimant may either be employed or not, and may either use services or not. Figure 2
summarizes the four alternative possible employment states, and Figure 3 shows the 16 possible
employment and service use states in the two time periods.
The rows Figure 2 represent the employment status in period one and the columns show the
status in period two. We denote employment status (E) by a 1 for employment and 0 for
nonemployment. Accounting for employment status in the two periods, we use the first numeral to
indicate employment status in period one and the second numeral to indicate employment status in
period two. For example, E10 represents the group of UI claimants employed in the first 13 weeks,
9Only a small fraction of UI claimants actually have more than one spell of joblessness in a benefit year.  
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but not employed after 13 weeks. The numbers in parentheses are the proportion of sample in each
employment group. The first number is the share in the full sample, and the second number is the
share in the top 30 percent of the WPRS distribution. Introducing a PRA would be most likely to
move UI claimants from either E10 or E01 to E11. There could also be movement from the largest
cell, E00 to either E10 or perhaps E11. Our simulations inducing quicker return to work investigate
the cost impacts of such movements.  
To create the employed and not-employed groups in the two periods, we set clear definitions
for these concepts based on available administrative data. Our definitions are set to approximate
qualification for the first and second bonus payments from a PRA. A claimant is classified as
employed in the first period if full-time equivalent weeks of UI benefits drawn is less than or equal
to 13.9 That is, if total UI compensation paid in the benefit year divided by the weekly benefit
amount (WBA) is less than or equal to 13. We adopted this definition since week-by-week UI
compensation data were not available to us.  
The definition of employment in the second period is based on quarterly wage records. For
the second bonus to be paid, a claimant must remain employed at least six months. We examine the
three quarters of wage records following the quarter in which the benefit year begin (BYB) date
occurred. A client is considered employed in the second period if any wages are present in the first
and third quarters following the quarter in which the BYB occurs, and if wages total $2,000 or more
in the second quarter following the BYB. Since a quarter is 13 weeks long, there must be some
employment in the first full quarter after the quarter of filing for UI benefits if there is reemployment
within 13 weeks and it is maintained for six months. However, it is not necessary to require
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employment for that full quarter, so we require only $1 in earnings to appear in the wage record for
that quarter. We require at least $2,000 in earnings during the second quarter, since this
approximates the minimum wage for 13 weeks at 30 hours per week. Finally, six months continuous
employment may be achieved without being employed throughout the third quarter after claiming
benefits, so we require only $1 in earnings during that quarter.  
In our simulations, the first bonus will be paid if there is employment in period one by the
above definition, provided a PRA has not been exhausted by spending on employment services.
However, a second bonus will be paid only if there is employment in both periods. That is, provided
money remains in the PRA, a second bonus payment results for those in group E11, but not for those
in group E01.   
Figure 3 provides a representation of the possibilities for service use in the two time periods
of the benefit year. Using notation like that for employment, S11 denotes the group purchasing
services in both time periods. S10 represents the group of claimants who purchase services in the
first period, but not in the second period. When simulating expenditures from PRAs, it is important
to note that receipt of services in the second period disqualifies a claimant from being paid a second
bonus.  
For each of the four employment groups, E11, E10, E01, and E00, there are four possible
service purchases groups. Figure 3 adds the service purchase groups to the employment outcome
groups to yield the 16 employment and service groups that are the basis of our simulations. Table
6 presents information about the relative size of each of these 16 groups of profiled UI claimants.
The table also provides mean values for each group on important UI program and demographic
characteristics. Among the employment groups, about one third are employed in both periods by our
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definitions, another third are not employed in either period, and the remaining third are employed
in one but not both time periods.  
For each of the four major employment groups, Table 6 orders the service receipt groups by
the likelihood of bonus payment. That is, bonuses would more likely be paid to those in groups S00
and S10, while those in groups S01 and S11 could be paid a first bonus but not a second bonus.
Within each of the four major employment groups, the largest service group is S00—no services
used in either period.  
In terms of average full time equivalent (FTE) weeks of UI benefits paid in the benefit year,
the shortest mean durations are for the employment groups with employment in the first period.
Groups E11 and E10 have mean durations of 3.8 and 2.5 weeks respectively. The mean durations
of UI receipt for E01 and E00 are 19.3 and 22.9 weeks, respectively.  
The entitled duration of UI benefits and the mean weekly benefit amount (WBA) are similar
across the employment groups. This is true both for the actual WBA data and assuming the new
2003 maximum WBA in Georgia of $300 per week.  
Workers under age 25 constitute 8.8 percent of our analysis sample. The most common
reemployment pattern for these younger workers was to gain reemployment in period one, but not
to hold it in period two. For those in the 25 to 45 age group, the most common pattern was
employment in both periods. Among workers over age 45, the most common pattern was to be out
of work in both periods. The greatest latitude for reemployment response to PRAs may be among
younger and older workers.  
To group claimants by income, we examined quarterly earnings reported in wage records
during the first four of the five quarters preceding the benefit claim, which is known as the “base
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period” for UI. From these quarterly wages we selected the highest value as a proxy for earnings in
a quarter of full working hours. We then ranked these and identified claimants in the bottom quarter
of the distribution as the low-income group. The largest share of low-income claimants were those
who found employment in the first period but not in the second. This may have resulted partly from
our definition of second period employment that requires at least $2,000 earnings in the second
quarter after claim. However, those not employed in either period had a dramatically lower share
in the low-income group.  
Table 7 presents a summary of characteristics for the 16 employment and service groups in
the top 30 percent of the WPRS distribution. As expected for this targeted group, in the absence of
a behavioral response, smaller proportions of the sample would qualify for either a first or second
bonus. The average duration of entitled weeks of UI is distributed like the whole sample, but the
average number of UI weeks of compensation is uniformly higher. Mean WBAs are somewhat
higher, and the sample includes a significantly higher proportion of older workers. The age and
earnings results are consistent with the goals of WPRS targeting, which aims to serve dislocated
workers.  
7. Statewide Simulation Results
The simulations involve applying the prices for services to the patterns of service use by
individuals in the 16 employment/service groups defined in the Georgia sample. Since the
simulations are based on individual claimant observations, we simply apply the proposed PRA rules
to each observation in the data. This approach is preferred to one relying on subgroup averages that
could generate misleading results because of imposing PRA rules at an aggregate rather than
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individual level. For example, the mean services expenditure for a particular employment/services
group could indicate that mean PRA budgets are exhausted before either the second bonus payments
can be made or services are purchased in period two. However, for some individuals who used fewer
services than average for the group in period one, there may be sufficient funds for services or a
bonus in period two.  
Even with our rich Georgia data set, we cannot observe the likely response to several features
of the proposed PRAs. For example, 1) the proportion of claimants who will accept a PRA offer, 2)
the effect of charging for services on choices about participating in services, and 3) the effect of
PRA offers on the duration of benefit receipt? We choose simple answers to each of these questions.
If a state were actually to implement PRAs, these parameters would be monitored and the
simulations updated for purposes of managing enrollment rates. Our approach is to compute baseline
PRA enrollment estimates assuming no behavioral response to any of the incentives introduced by
PRAs.  We then examine the effect of relaxing these assumptions.
Regarding the acceptance rate of PRA offers, only the Illinois reemployment bonus
experiment had a similar requirement. In that instance, 80 percent of those offered the chance of
qualifying for a bonus payment agreed to participate in the demonstration (Woodbury and
Spiegelman 1987). There were no particular claimant characteristics correlated with the decision to
participate. Our assumption for the simulations is that everyone offered a PRA accepts. This
assumption could be easily adjusted by rescaling our simulated enrollment rates by the reciprocal
of the observed participation acceptance rate.  
If the imposition of prices reduces the use of services, then our simulation will overestimate
service use and perhaps underestimate the bonuses paid. Our simulations assume that the services
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chosen in the absence of directly charging for them are the same services that would be chosen if
UI claimants were required to pay out of PRAs for intensive, supportive, and training services.
Without observing choice in an environment where services must be paid for by participants, it is
impossible to make a reasonable alternative assumption. At the extreme, it is possible that given the
choice between a PRA and free services, claimants would accept a PRA and the chance of a cash
bonus only if they had no intention of using the PRA to buy services. To include this possibility we
include simulations where there is no payment for services.
The simulation methodology is summarized in Table 8 for a PRA involving all three
components: 1) a reemployment bonus, 2) purchase of services, and 3) extended income
maintenance payments. Given the 16 employment/services categories defined for the two PRA
decision periods in the benefit year, we set baseline simulations for targeted PRAs by calculating
the mean cost of services used and bonuses paid for claimants in each group. These computations
assume that PRAs were provided to the top 30 percent of the WPRS profiling distribution of Georgia
UI claimants assigned a profiling score and initially eligible for at least 20 weeks of UI benefits.
This simulation also assumes that every PRA offered is $3,000. The mean spending for each of the
16 employment/service groups is the simple row sum of the bonus, costs, spending for services, and
extended compensation for the two periods listed in Table 8. The simulations amount to multiplying
the mean group spending by the group proportion in the full sample to yield the expected budget
impact listed in the far right column of the table for each group listed by row. The mean cost per
offer is the sum of these expected budget impacts for the 16 groups, or $2,475. This result suggests
that the actual budgetary cost of making a $3,000 PRA offer more than $500 less than that amount.
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The proposed legislation would provide $3.6 billion to fund PRA offers in states for two
years. The budget is to be allocated among the states in proportion to their share of the nation’s
measured unemployment. Based on calendar year 2002 figures, 2.37 percent of the nation’s
unemployed were in Georgia, meaning the state’s share of the PRA budget would be $85.32 million
(Lawrence 2003). If every claimant who was offered a $3,000 PRA spent his or her full grant, then
28,440 offers could be made. However, under the assumptions of the simulation presented in Table
8, offers could be made to 34,473 claimants. Changing the simulation assumptions will change this
result.  
Table 9 summarizes a simulation wherein PRAs include bonus offers and spending on
services, but there is no provision for extended UI benefits. The expected cost per $3,000 PRA offer
targeted to the top 30 percent most likely to exhaust their UI entitlement is $1,452. This expected
cost figure suggests that 58,760 offers could be made with the planned budget grant to Georgia. That
would be more than 29,000 offers in each of two years, or 70 percent more offers than the number
possible when the extended compensation feature is part of PRAs.  
The simulation summarized in Table 10 presumes the only feature of the PRA is a targeted
reemployment bonus (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner forthcoming). Effectively, this simulation
assumes that the prices for services are all zero and there is no extended compensation. The expected
cost per $3,000 targeted bonus offer is simulated as being $1,040, so that 82,038 such offers could
be made given the assumed budget for Georgia.  
A complete array of simulation results is presented in Table 11. Simulations were computed
on the targeted sample of the top 30 percent most likely to exhaust UI as identified by the new
Georgia WPRS profiling model, assuming the PRA offers were a uniform $3,000. For the three PRA
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definitions examined in Tables 8, 9, and 10, simulation results are presented for the baseline case
of no behavioral response, and assuming that the PRA offer shortens insured durations by 1 and 2
weeks. A 1-week response is at the very top end of all reemployment bonus offer impacts estimated
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001). We consider the 2-week response to ensure that we span the entire
range of possible responses to PRA offers. The 1- and 2-week behavioral responses are simulated
by simply expanding the period one reemployment definition from 13 weeks to 14 and 15 weeks,
respectively. For these simulations, counts of services purchased are also adjusted to the alternate
time frames.  
For the full feature PRA with all three elements, a 1-week impact raises the average cost by
$40 per offer and a 2-week impact raises the average cost by $76. These changes translate into
relatively modest reductions in the number of offers possible. This result obtains because the bonus
payment costs are only a fraction of PRA spending which also includes buying services and drawing
extended compensation. The 1- and 2-week response has the same effect on costs and enrollment
for the two-feature PRA with a bonus and purchase of services. For the bonus-only offer, the 1-week
impact raises the average cost by $46 and the 2-week impact by $91. Since these bonus only changes
are relative to a smaller average cost per offer than the 2- or 3-feature PRA, the proportionate
reduction in offers possible is greater. Nonetheless, even allowing for a sizable behavioral response,
the bonus-only offer could be made to a significantly larger group given the available budget.
8. Choosing the Bonus or Services
Imputing effects of positive prices on the bundles of services chosen is a difficult task.
However, we offer an example that clearly exposes the alternatives available. Our example answers
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the simple question: What reemployment outcomes would make a participant indifferent between
either of the two extremes: 1) purchasing no services with the hope of receiving the full PRA amount
in bonus payments, or 2) spending the entire PRA amount to purchase services with the hope of
speeding up reemployment or receiving a higher reemployment wage? The elements of this decision
are summarized in Table 12 by weekly incomes under alternative choices. The example assumes the
PRA value is $3,000, the WBA is $300, and weekly reemployment earnings are earnings $800. The
bottom row of Table 12 presents net present values of the bonus-only and services-only alternatives
assuming an annual discount rate of 3 percent.  
Choice between the alternative strategies is made at the time of the PRA offer. The bonus-
only column in Table 12 assumes WBA receipt for 12 weeks, with a bonus of $1,800 paid in week
13 together with $800 in earnings. Steady employment is then maintained for six months and a
$1,200 bonus and $800 in earnings accrues in week 39, yielding a net present value of $27,825.  
A PRA recipient could rationally choose to spend the entire budget on services if either
earnings were expected to increase or reemployment were expected to occur sooner. Compared to
the no services strategy, the third column of Table 12 shows that weekly wages would have to
exceed $911, or nearly 14 percent higher than the assumed $800 baseline reemployment wage, if
the PRA was spent on services and reemployment occurred in the 13th week. Such a large gain in
earnings is unlikely to result from reemployment services or short-term job training (Leigh 1995,
pp. 88–91).
If reemployment services resulted in no wage gain but did yield quicker reemployment, the
fourth column of Table 12 shows that the new job must begin by the 7th week after the PRA is
offered—or 6 weeks sooner—to make the PRA recipient as well off as if no services were purchased
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and steady employment started in the 13th week and lasted six months. Evidence on the
effectiveness of employment services and job training suggests that both improve the chances of
reemployment, but neither speeds return to work by as much as 6 weeks. Job training may actually
prolong somewhat the time until return to work, while reemployment services shorten
unemployment durations of UI recipients by at most 2 weeks (O’Leary 2004).
Reemployment services are cost effective because they are inexpensive to deliver, not
because they have large impacts. The structure of the proposed PRA, and the expected impacts of
services and training on earnings and reemployment, suggest that claimants will tend to conserve
PRA funds in favor of reemployment bonus payments rather than spending on services early in their
UI benefit year.   
9. Substate Budget Allocation Alternatives 
The proposed Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 allocated $3.6 billion for PRA
enrollments over two years with funds distributed to states in proportion to their share of national
unemployment. Based on 2002 unemployment figures, the Georgia share is 2.37 percent, or $85.32
million. The proposal also required allocation of PRA money within states by the same rule.  Table
13 summarizes how money would be distributed to WIA service delivery regions (SDRs) within
Georgia based on this rule and an alternate rule with shares depending on counts of UI claims. The
latter rule would allocate PRA funding based on the extent to which unemployed workers qualify
for UI. Such a rule would be most appropriate for the national allocation to states, since it would
provide larger shares to states having UI eligibility rules accommodating the regional unemployment
23
situation. The current formula allocates PRA money to states based on the level of unemployment
regardless of whether state UI law adequately provides for the jobless.  
Based on the allocation rule in proposed legislation, Georgia SDR 3, which includes Atlanta,
would receive 37.9 percent of the state PRA budget, while SDR 1 in Northern Georgia would get
8.4 percent. Under the alternate rule where the allocation depends on the share of valid initial UI
claims, the SDR 3 share would fall to 34.4 percent, while the SDR 1 share would rise to 11.1
percent. As the far right column in Table 13 shows, changing the budget allocation rule would
decrease the dollar funding in SDR 3 by 9.2 percent and raise the dollar funding in SDR 1 by 30.8
percent. The change in funding formula would benefit Northern Georgia, leave Coastal Georgia
unchanged, and hurt Atlanta and the balance of the state.  
Since PRA offers are to be made based on WPRS model predicted probability of UI benefit
exhaustion, for any given budget allocation to an SDR the number of offers that can be made depend
on the employment probabilities in the two periods and the pattern of service use. Service use
patterns vary across regions within the state both because of custom and because the services best
suited to local labor market conditions differ. To exhaust the SDR budget allocation for PRAs, the
SDRs will enroll differing proportions of the top of the WPRS profiling score distribution.   
Based on the new Georgia WPRS model, Table 14 shows the average actual cost of making
a $3,000 PRA offer in each of the 12 Georgia SDRs for the full sample and for offers to top groups
in the WPRS score distribution. The PRA simulated includes a bonus and purchase of services, but
not extended compensation. Starting with the top 15 percent, costs for five additional groups are
10In these simulations, totaling the spending figures across SDRs does not yield exactly $42.66 million, or half
of the expected Georgia grant of $85.32 million, because computations in each SDR are based on costs for targeted
groups set by rounding to whole percentile point groups of the profiling distribution.  
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examined by lowering the threshold to include 5 percentage points more of the distribution in each
group.10  
The distribution of SDR scores around the state of Georgia is not uniform. High
unemployment areas, such as central city Atlanta, tend to have more UI claimants at the top of the
state distribution of WPRS scores than low unemployment areas. Consequently, a high-
unemployment area would most likely exhaust a PRA budget at a higher threshold of the state
WPRS distribution than an area with lower unemployment that would need to go deeper in the
distribution.  The figures in Table 14 show the numbers of UI claimants in top groups of the state
WPRS distribution who could be offered a PRA in each SDR in a given year. Table 14 also shows
how far into the statewide profiling distribution each SDR has to go to exhaust its PRA budget under
the proposed and alternative budget allocation rules. Results are given for the within-state budget
allocations based both on the distribution of unemployment and the distribution of valid initial UI
claims. We see that in the Atlanta area, SDR 3 enrollment could be made to claimants in the top 19
percent of the statewide profiling distribution under the proposed budget allocation and claimants
in the top 17 percent under the alternative allocation. The similar target groups in SDR 1 are the top
31 and 41 percent, respectively. This table makes it clear that under the proposed funding
mechanism, it is impossible to set a single threshold score to be applied statewide in all SDRs.  
Table 15 repeats the exercise of Table 14, except that the percentages listed are not the local
SDR thresholds based on the statewide distribution of WPRS scores; instead, they are the
percentages of the top of the local distribution of WPRS scores. That is, instead of showing the point
in the statewide distribution where local enrollment would stop, the numbers in Table 15 indicate
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the share of all profiled claimants in an SDR that could be offered a PRA. The table indicates that,
if all those offered a PRA accept, then between 20 and 30 percent of the top of the profiling
distribution in each SDR could be offered a PRA. 
In Table 15 the enrollment numbers by the unemployment method suggest that SDR 1 should
enroll 2,504 per year into PRAs, or about 200 per month. If the PRA acceptance rate is lower, the
figures should be rescaled by the reciprocal of the acceptance rate. For example, if 80 percent of
offers are accepted, then PRAs should be offered to 125 percent of the target number. For SDR 1,
instead of offering 2,500 PRAs, 3,000 offers would be made.   
10. Summary and Extensions
Congress proposed PRAs in the Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003. The legislation did not
succeed, but features of the PRA may resurface in future proposals. The recommended PRA would
provide each eligible UI claimant with a special account of up to $3,000 that can be used to purchase
job training and intensive reemployment and supportive services. Any funds remaining in the PRA
could be paid as a cash bonus for reemployment within 13 weeks. Claimants exhausting their regular
UI entitlement could draw extended compensation from remaining PRA funds at the rate of their
WBAs.  The Back to Work bill called for a budget of $3.6 billion for PRAs, with the money to be
committed over a two-year period. The budget for PRAs was to be divided according to the state
shares of total unemployment. 
This paper provides a simulation analysis of questions relevant to implementation of PRAs
by states. The analysis is done using data for the state of Georgia. The simulations rely on recent
patterns of intensive, supportive, and training services use. Simulations for alternative rules setting
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the PRA amount and varying behavioral responses are examined. Like the legislative proposal,
simulated PRA offers are targeted using WPRS models.
Our baseline simulations presume that the pattern of using reemployment services observed
in one-stop centers under WIA would continue if PRAs were introduced. These simulations start by
asking the question, what would the average PRA offer of $3,000 actually cost the system under the
current pattern of service use and UI benefit receipt observed? The key question examined is how
many PRA offers could be made with a fixed budget? Under the proposed legislation, the PRA grant
to Georgia would be $85.32 million. If every PRA recipient spent the entire $3,000 grant, then
28,440 offers could be made over two years, or 14,220 offers per year. However, our simulations
suggest that many more PRAs could be offered in Georgia given this budget.  
If there is no behavioral response to the $3,000 PRA offered to the top 30 percent of those
most likely to exhaust UI, our simulation suggests that offers could be made to 34,473 claimants
over two years, or 17,236 per year. This number is 20 percent more than the number offered
assuming all PRA recipients exhaust their budget. Even assuming that PRA offers induced UI spells
that were one or two weeks shorter than usual, the targeted simulations suggest that at least 33,446
PRAs of $3,000 each could be made over two years in Georgia given the projected budget. A
prudent approach to PRA enrollment would be to enroll about 16,000 the first year and monitor the
rate of using the PRA budget and then to adjust enrollment in the second year.  
Since PRAs involve paying for intensive, supportive, and training services our simulations
made assumptions about the prices for these services. We set prices based on total WIA expenditures
in 2001 and observed service participation rates. There is uncertainty about what the actual prices
would be for services if PRAs were implemented, so we conducted price sensitivity analysis of our
11The simulation reported in this document is based on information from the records of individuals 46,855
targeted individuals. Because of space constraints and confidentiality concerns, the spreadsheet is based on data
aggregated by subgroups. The results are qualitatively similar but not identical to the micro data based simulations. 
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simulation results. We found that doubling the price of services reduced the number of offers
possible by about 20 percent. Similarly, halving service prices increased the number of offers
possible by about 20 percent. That is, the cost of PRA offers is relatively insensitive to changes in
the price of services. Appendix A to this report presents results from a spreadsheet that contains an
aggregate version of a simulation cutting services prices in half. State policymakers could use the
Microsoft Excel version of the spreadsheet to examine the effect of changing key parameters, such
as the price of services, to observe how the change would affect the various outcomes of the
simulation.11 The simulations presented in Appendix A assume the PRA provides for services
purchases and bonus payments, but not extended income maintenance payments.
Since the extended benefits feature is the most expensive part of PRA offers, we conducted
several simulations of PRAs involving only a reemployment bonus and purchase of services.
Assuming no behavioral response, the average cost per offer dropped to $1,452 and the number of
offers possible rose to 58,760. Even assuming a two-week response to the offer, nearly 28,000 offers
per year are possible with this simplified PRA.
We further simplified the PRA offer and performed simulations under the extreme
assumption that service prices are zero. That is, “free services” simulations. This assumes essentially
that the PRA is a reemployment bonus offer, and that UI claimants may use intensive, supportive,
or training services as they choose. The PRA costs declined and possible enrollments for Georgia
increased to about 39,000 per year under our simulations.  
An important question in implementing PRAs, in which customers must pay for services
from their account that were previously provided at no charge, is whether or not the customers could
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still get the same set of services they chose before? We found that under a PRA with only a bonus
and purchase of services, only about 1.0 percent of beneficiaries would have a shortfall in
purchasing their desired bundle of services. If there were no bonus payments, then only 0.5 percent
of claimants could not afford their desired services. Taken together these results suggest that $3,000
PRAs granted to the top 30 percent of the profiling distribution would be sufficient to buy the
preferred set of reemployment services for all but less than 1 percent of claimants.  
While we did not simulate how charging for services may change the choice of services used,
we did consider a simple example to reveal the choices involved. Given estimates of the likely effect
of reemployment services on the speed of reemployment and earnings for reemployment, and the
time horizon involved in PRA decisions, most PRA receipients will probably conserve PRA funds
by using fewer intensive, supportive, and training services than if they were free. Account recipients
will instead seek speedy employment with the aim of cashing out their PRAs as a reemployment
bonus.  
We also did simulations of an alternative definition of the PRA amount from a fixed cash
amount to a multiple of the WBA with a minimum set at $1,500. Such a rule is similar to the design
of reemployment bonus offers in the Pennsylvania and Washington field experiments. Under this
design the average cost per PRA offer declined and the number of offers possible increased.  
It is important to consider alternatives to the fixed $3,000 value of the PRA given other
design parameters. In particular, the rule specifying that 60 percent of the remaining PRA balance
would be paid immediately if reemployment is achieved within the first 13 weeks of claim raises
concerns about the PRA effect on reemployment wage rates. All of the offers tested in the four
reemployment bonus experiments required at least 16 weeks of continuous reemployment before
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a bonus was paid. In none of the experiments did bonus offers induce claimants to accept lower
paying jobs (Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury 2001, p. 164). However, that might not be the case
under the proposed PRA design with 60 percent of the balance paid upon reemployment and a fixed
$3,000 grant regardless of prior earnings history. In particular, low-wage workers may be induced
to accept any paying job to qualify for a quick $1,800 payment. A PRA design with the grant set at
a multiple of the WBA above a minimum value should be considered.  
We also examined the proposed and alternative rules for allocation to SDRs within the state.
Under the proposed rule which allocates money based on the SDR share of state unemployment, it
will be impossible to set a single threshold for PRA enrollment based on the statewide distribution
of WPRS profiling scores. Exhausting SDR budget allocations would require PRA offers to profiled
claimants anywhere between the top 20 percent and the top 40 percent of the statewide distribution
of WPRS scores. On average, about 27 percent of the WPRS ranking in any SDR would be given
an offer with a range from 20 to 36 percent at the top of the distribution. We also report simulation
results for SDR allocations based on shares of valid new UI claims. 
Finally, it should be reiterated that the simulation results discussed in this report presume that
all PRA offers made to targeted UI claimants are accepted, but that might not be the case. If only
a fraction of offers are accepted, then the number of offers made can be scaled up accordingly. For
example, if an 80 percent acceptance rate occurs, like in the Illinois reemployment bonus
experiment, then 25 percent more offers could be made. The PRA acceptance rate is one of the
parameters that should be monitored by states during PRA implementation, and first-year
enrollment.  
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The introduction of PRA offers into the UI system may have effects beyond changes in the
mean duration of benefit receipt. Two particular cautions have been raised regarding reemployment
bonus offers. These are known as entry and displacement effects (Meyer 1995). Under usual
conditions in the United States, only about two-thirds of those eligible for UI benefits actually claim
and collect them during a spell of joblessness (Blank and Card 1991). The availability of a cash
bonus could induce some job-separated people to enter the UI system and claim benefits, while in
the absence of a possible bonus offer they otherwise would have quickly accepted a new job.
Displacement would occur if a cash bonus offer increases reemployment of those offered the bonus
at the expense of some of those not offered the bonus. However, UI entry effects from the bonus are
much less likely if bonus offers are “targeted to those workers whose characteristics are highly
correlated with long-term unemployment” (Executive Office of the President, Council of Economic
Advisers 2003, p. 125). Targeting PRA offers would also mollify any displacement effects since
only a fraction of UI claimants would be given offers. 
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Table 1  Summary of Sample Size for PRA Analysis
Selection criteria Resulting sample size
Georgia UI data currently available (*1) 851,054
Start of WIA to present (7/1/00 - 9/30/01) 318,837
Clients have a profiling score 232,617
Clients have 20 or more weeks of entitlement 156,220
Final sample size (*2) 156,181
      Employed 1st period (E1,*3) 90,299
      Employed 2nd period (E2, *4) 66,175
      Training/intensive services in 1st period (S1) 36,483
      Training/intensive services in 2nd period (S2) 11,411
(*1) Based on clients’ most recent UI claim covering benefit year begin dates (BYB) January 1, 1996, through September
30, 2001. Since the analysis requires complete benefit year information, September 30, 2001, marks the latest inflow date
for which all UI compensation and services information is known, given the data currently available to the Upjohn
Institute.
(*2) Although only monetarily valid claims are included in the sample, 30 observations were excluded because no wage
data were found in the five quarters preceding the benefit year begin date. Another 9 observations were excluded due
to missing data needed to solve the new Georgia profiling model for the simulations.
(*3) This is the number of persons whose full-time equivalent weeks of unemployment is 13 weeks or less. Full-time
equivalent weeks is defined as total UI compensation received in the benefit year divided by the weekly benefit amount.
Since week-by-week UI compensation data are not available, this is meant to proxy the first spell of unemployment.
(*4) Based on the three quarters of wage data following the quarter in which the benefit year begin date occurred. A
client is considered employed in the second period if some wages are present in the first and third quarters following the
quarter in which the BYB occurs and wages total $2,000 or more in the second quarter following the BYB.  
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Table 2  Intensive, Supportive, and Training Service Usage 
during the First 13 weeks and the Remainder of the UI Benefit Year
Georgia UI Claimants July 1, 2000, to September 30, 2001
First 13 weeks After 13 weeks
Service type Service description Participants Rate Participants Rate
Intensive Service coordination 773 0.0049 278 0.0018
Intensive Customer service plan 29,456 0.1886 7,141 0.0457
Intensive In-depth assessment 159 0.0015 68 0.0006
Intensive Counseling 31,722 0.2031 7,939 0.0508
Intensive Expanded workshop 588 0.0038 486 0.0031
Supportive Supportive services 2,617 0.0168 1,006 0.0064
Training Job skill training 4,229 0.0207 2,795 0.0179
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Table 3  Statewide Service Participation Rate Summary
First 13 weeks After 13 weeks
Variable Service description Sample size Participants Rate Participants Rate
i1 Service coordination 156,181 773 0.0049 278 0.0018
i2 Customer service plan 156,181 29,456 0.1886 7,141 0.0457
i3 In-depth assessment 107,126 159 0.0015 68 0.0006
i4 Counseling 156,181 31,722 0.2031 7,939 0.0508
i5 Expanded workshop 156,181 588 0.0038 486 0.0031
c18 Supportive services 156,181 2,617 0.0168 1,006 0.0064
t Training 156,181 4,229 0.0207 2,795 0.0179
           
Total Intensive/Supportive/Training 156,181 36,483 0.2336 11,411 0.0731
c00 Job referral 156,181 34,308 0.2197 26,305 0.1684
c01 Order search 156,181 84,616 0.5418 31,987 0.2048
c02 Job search planning 156,181 40,549 0.2596 18,752 0.1201
c03 Service needs eval 156,181 64,987 0.4161 8,627 0.0552
c04 Orientation 156,181 56,767 0.3635 4,114 0.0263
c04W Orientation w/workshop 107,126 23,104 0.2157 1,982 0.0185
c05 ERP 156,181 57,609 0.3689 27,730 0.1776
c07 Specific LMI 156,181 113,288 0.7254 38,118 0.2441
c08 Resume preparation 156,181 11,193 0.0717 4,334 0.0277
c10 Workshopsa 156,181 38,425 0.2460 10,992 0.0704
c101     RePlace Yourself 107,126 7,354 0.0686 582 0.0054
c102     Financial/stress 107,126 2,240 0.0209 874 0.0082
c103     Resume 107,126 3,032 0.0283 1,284 0.0120
c104     Internet 107,126 1,838 0.0172 1,109 0.0104
c105     Interviewing 107,126 3,683 0.0344 1,831 0.0171
c106     Retention 107,126 134 0.0013 99 0.0009
c107     Applications 107,126 1,159 0.0108 564 0.0053
c108     Networking 107,126 2,625 0.0245 1,342 0.0125
c10A     Other workshop 107,126 4,969 0.0464 3,660 0.0342
c11 Job search assistance 156,181 37,211 0.2383 19,714 0.1262
c12 Call-in 156,181 6,561 0.0420 4,561 0.0292
c13 Job development 156,181 6,976 0.0447 3,809 0.0244
c14 Job finding club 156,181 86 0.0006 54 0.0003
c15 Test 156,181 858 0.0055 626 0.0040
c16 Bonding assistance 156,181 150 0.0010 70 0.0004
c20 REU/profiled 156,181 47,177 0.3021 65 0.0004
pro Profiling/CAP 156,181 57,837 0.3703 11,571 0.0741
a For participation after January 1, 2001 data on the specific type of workshop is also available. 
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Table 4 Statewide Service Participation Rate Summary for Top 30 Percent of Profiling
Scores
First 13 weeks After 13 weeks
Variable Description Sample size Participants Rate Participants Rate
i1 Service coordination     46,855 283 0.0060 83 0.0018
i2 Customer service plan    46,855 14,836 0.3166 3,674 0.0784
i3 In-depth assessment      34,431 63 0.0018 24 0.0007
i4 Counseling               46,855 15,610 0.3332 3,920 0.0837
i5 Expanded workshop        46,855 94 0.0020 96 0.0020
c18 Ref to support services  46,855 983 0.0210 311 0.0066
t Training 46,855 2,289 0.0489 1,122 0.0239
Total Total intensive/training 46,855 17,777 0.3794 5,221 0.1114
c00 Job referral             46,855 9,642 0.2058 7,395 0.1578
c01 Order search             46,855 27,301 0.5827 11,152 0.2380
c02 Job search planning      46,855 15,024 0.3206 6,668 0.1423
c03 Service needs eval       46,855 33,617 0.7175 2,851 0.0608
c04 Orientation              46,855 30,939 0.6603 1,350 0.0288
c04W Orientation w/workshop 34,431 13,449 0.3906 736 0.0214
c05 ERP                      46,855 32,126 0.6856 15,124 0.3228
c07 Specific LMI             46,855 35,317 0.7538 13,025 0.2780
c08 Resume preparation       46,855 4,858 0.1037 1,601 0.0342
c10 Workshops                46,855 20,852 0.4450 5,633 0.1202
c101     RePlace Yourself       34,431 3,717 0.1080 247 0.0072
c102     Financial/stress       34,431 1,280 0.0372 486 0.0141
c103     Resume                 34,431 1,915 0.0556 704 0.0204
c104     Internet               34,431 1,026 0.0298 583 0.0169
c105     Interviewing           34,431 2,272 0.0660 922 0.0268
c106     Retention              34,431 58 0.0017 34 0.0010
c107     Applications           34,431 770 0.0224 312 0.0091
c108     Networking             34,431 1,492 0.0433 701 0.0204
c10A     Other workshop         34,431 2,944 0.0855 1,948 0.0566
c11 Job search assistance    46,855 16,241 0.3466 8,582 0.1832
c12 Call-in                  46,855 2,124 0.0453 1,374 0.0293
c13 Job development          46,855 2,614 0.0558 1,363 0.0291
c14 Job finding club         46,855 26 0.0006 17 0.0004
c15 Test                     46,855 485 0.0104 334 0.0071
c16 Bonding assistance       46,855 39 0.0008 17 0.0004
c20 REU/profiled             46,855 30,620 0.6535 24 0.0005
pro Profiling/CAP            46,855 32,725 0.6984 5,812 0.1240
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Table 5 Prices for Intensive, Supportive, and Training Services
Georgia UI claims
7/1/2000 to 9/30/2001
Total
services
Cost 
factor
Service
price ($)
Intensive services
Service coordination 1,051 1.0 356
Customer service plan 36,597 1.0 356
In-depth assessment 227 2.0 712
Counseling 39,661 2.0 712
Expanded workshop 1,074 2.0 712
Supportive services 3,623 3.0 1,068
Training services 7,024 4.0 1,424
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Table 6 UI and Demographic Summary by Bonus Qualification / Service Receipt Group
Group Size
Proportion
of total
sample
Entitled
weeks
FTE
weeks
Mean WBA 
(new max) Age < 25  Age > 45
Income,
bottom
25%
E11S00 42,517 0.272 23.8 3.3 252 0.102 0.226 0.235
E11S10 10,329 0.066 24.1 5.7 258 0.070 0.263 0.203
E11S01 436 0.003 23.4 4.3 243 0.062 0.230 0.298
E11S11 325 0.002 23.9 6.4 256 0.052 0.269 0.206
Group E11 Total 53,607 0.343 23.8 3.8 253 0.095 0.234 0.230
E10S00 30,179 0.193 23.3 2.1 231 0.135 0.244 0.368
E10S10 5,474 0.035 23.6 5.0 234 0.100 0.296 0.344
E10S01 683 0.004 22.7 1.9 200 0.204 0.201 0.564
E10S11 356 0.002 23.0 3.6 213 0.141 0.220 0.461
Group E10 Total 36,692 0.235 23.3 2.5 231 0.131 0.251 0.369
E01S00 8,624 0.055 23.9 19.4 263 0.057 0.281 0.163
E01S10 2,656 0.017 24.0 18.8 261 0.057 0.283 0.179
E01S01 263 0.002 23.9 19.8 259 0.057 0.313 0.205
E01S11 1,025 0.007 23.9 19.9 258 0.049 0.326 0.185
Group E01 Total 12,568 0.080 23.9 19.3 262 0.056 0.286 0.169
E00S00 34,976 0.224 24.0 22.9 258 0.061 0.347 0.202
E00S10 10,015 0.064 24.0 22.7 257 0.056 0.375 0.207
E00S01 2,020 0.013 23.7 23.1 252 0.059 0.326 0.238
E00S11 6,303 0.040 23.9 23.2 253 0.047 0.414 0.232
Group E00 Total 53,314 0.341 24.0 22.9 257 0.058 0.360 0.208
Total 156,181 1.000 23.8 11.3 250 0.088 0.285 0.250
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Table 7 UI and Demographic Summary by Bonus Qualification/Service Receipt Group
for the Top 30 Percent of the Profiling Distribution
Group Size
Proportion
of total
sample
Entitled
weeks
FTE
weeks
Mean
WBA
(original)
Mean
WBA
(new max) Age < 25 Age > 45
Income,
bottom
25%
E11S00 7,501 0.160 24.2 5.3 256 270 0.047 0.338 0.143
E11S10 4,830 0.103 24.1 6.2 245 261 0.060 0.305 0.209
E11S01 53 0.001 23.7 5.2 248 263 0.000 0.245 0.245
E11S11 110 0.002 24.1 7.7 250 266 0.055 0.282 0.136
Group E11 Total 12,494 0.267 24.2 5.7 252 266 0.052 0.324 0.169
E10S00 3,983 0.085 24.2 4.7 250 264 0.052 0.417 0.184
E10S10 2,195 0.047 23.8 6.2 232 246 0.082 0.384 0.293
E10S01 81 0.002 24.2 3.3 244 261 0.086 0.321 0.235
E10S11 88 0.002 23.5 6.8 228 240 0.103 0.333 0.341
Group E10 Total 6,347 0.135 24.1 5.2 243 257 0.064 0.403 0.225
E01S00 2,730 0.058 23.8 19.3 255 268 0.037 0.327 0.142
E01S10 1,288 0.027 23.8 18.6 247 261 0.058 0.323 0.190
E01S01 72 0.002 23.8 20.4 247 261 0.056 0.394 0.194
E01S11 533 0.011 23.8 19.9 248 263 0.047 0.323 0.167
Group E01 Total 4,623 0.099 23.8 19.2 252 265 0.044 0.326 0.159
E00S00 13,856 0.296 24.1 23.2 253 266 0.037 0.427 0.168
E00S10 5,249 0.112 24.0 22.8 245 260 0.047 0.431 0.206
E00S01 802 0.017 23.9 23.5 250 263 0.024 0.406 0.176
E00S11 3,484 0.074 23.9 23.1 241 255 0.042 0.475 0.233
Group E00 Total 23,391 0.499 24.0 23.1 249 263 0.040 0.434 0.186
Total 46,855 1.000 24.1 15.6 249 263 0.046 0.390 0.184
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Table 8 Breakdown of PRA Costs per Offer, Top 30 Percent, Baseline Scenario, All
Features
Bonus Costs ($) Spending for Services ($)
Group
Proportion
of sample 1st period 2nd period 1st period 2nd period
Extended
Compensation
($)
 Spending 
for group ($)
Expected
budget
impact ($)
E11S00 0.160 1,800 1,200 0 0 0 3,000 480
E11S10 0.103 1,118 745 1,137 0 0 3,000 309
E11S01 0.001 1,800 0 0 1,113 0 2,913 3
E11S11 0.002 970 0 1,383 629 0 2,982 7
E10S00 0.085 1,800 0 0 0 0 1,800 153
E10S10 0.047 1,109 0 1,151 0 0 2,261 106
E10S01 0.002 1,800 0 0 1,036 0 2,836 5
E10S11 0.002 1,017 0 1,305 668 0 2,990 6
E01S00 0.058 0 0 0 0 998 998 58
E01S10 0.027 0 0 1,181 0 472 1,652 45
E01S01 0.002 0 0 0 1,324 643 1,968 3
E01S11 0.011 0 0 1,168 1,060 249 2,476 28
E00S00 0.296 0 0 0 0 2,438 2,438 721
E00S10 0.112 0 0 1,180 0 1,396 2,576 289
E00S01 0.017 0 0 0 1,323 1,515 2,838 49
E00S11 0.074 0 0 1,195 1,062 606 2,862 213
Total 1.000 618 269 444 121 1,023 2,475 2,475
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Table 9 Breakdown of PRA Costs per Offer, Top 30 Percent, Baseline Scenario Bonus and
Purchase Services
Bonus Costs ($) Spending for Services ($)
Group
Proportion of
total sample 1st period 2nd period 1st period 2nd period
 Spending
for group ($)
Expected budget
impact ($)
   
E11S00 0.160 1,800 1,200 0 0 3,000 480
E11S10 0.103 1,118 745 1,137 0 3,000 309
E11S01 0.001 1,800 0 0 1,113 2,913 3
E11S11 0.002 970 0 1,383 629 2,982 7
E10S00 0.085 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 153
E10S10 0.047 1,109 0 1,151 0 2,261 106
E10S01 0.002 1,800 0 0 1,036 2,836 5
E10S11 0.002 1,017 0 1,305 668 2,990 6
E01S00 0.058 0 0 0 0 0 0
E01S10 0.027 0 0 1,181 0 1,181 32
E01S01 0.002 0 0 0 1,324 1,324 2
E01S11 0.011 0 0 1,168 1,060 2,228 25
E00S00 0.296 0 0 0 0 0 0
E00S10 0.112 0 0 1,180 0 1,180 132
E00S01 0.017 0 0 0 1,323 1,323 23
E00S11 0.074 0 0 1,195 1,062 2,256 168
Total 1.000 618 269 444 121 1,452 1,452
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Table 10 Breakdown of PRA Costs per Offer, Top 30 Percent, Baseline Scenario, Bonus
Only
Bonus costs ($) Services spending ($)
Group
Proportion of
total sample 1st period 2nd period 1st period 2nd period
Spending for
group ($)
Expected budget
impact ($)
E11S00 0.160 1,800 1,200 0 0 3,000 480
E11S10 0.103 1,800 1,200 0 0 3,000 309
E11S01 0.001 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 2
E11S11 0.002 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 4
E10S00 0.085 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 153
E10S10 0.047 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 84
E10S01 0.002 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 3
E10S11 0.002 1,800 0 0 0 1,800 3
E01S00 0.058 0 0 0 0 0 0
E01S10 0.027 0 0 0 0 0 0
E01S01 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0
E01S11 0.011 0 0 0 0 0 0
E00S00 0.296 0 0 0 0 0 0
E00S10 0.112 0 0 0 0 0 0
E00S01 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 0
E00S11 0.074 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1.000 724 316 0 0 0 1,040
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Table 11 Average Cost per PRA Offer and Total Number of Potential PRA Offers over
Two Years Given the Georgia PRA Budget
PRA scenario Average cost ($) Number of offers
Bonus, services, exhaustee payments 2,475 34,473
    1-week impact 2,515 33,924
    2-week impact 2,551 33,446
Bonus and purchase services 1,452 58,760
    1-week impact 1,491 57,223
    2-week impact 1,528 55,838
Bonus only with free services 1,040 82,038
    1-week impact 1,086 78,564
    2-week impact 1,131 75,438
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Table 12 Net Present Value (NPV) of Alternative PRA Use Choices ($)
Week
Bonus
only
Services only
Earnings gain Quicker job
1 300 300 300
2 300 300 300
3 300 300 300
4 300 300 300
5 300 300 300
6 300 300 300
7 300 300 800
8 300 300 800
9 300 300 800
10 300 300 800
11 300 300 800
12 300 300 800
13 2,600 911 800
14 800 911 800
15 800 911 800
16 800 911 800
17 800 911 800
18 800 911 800
19 800 911 800
20 800 911 800
21 800 911 800
22 800 911 800
23 800 911 800
24 800 911 800
25 800 911 800
26 800 911 800
27 800 911 800
28 800 911 800
29 800 911 800
30 800 911 800
31 800 911 800
32 800 911 800
33 800 911 800
34 800 911 800
35 800 911 800
36 800 911 800
37 800 911 800
38 800 911 800
39 2,000 911 800
NPV 27,825 27,818 27,849
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Table 13 Distribution of State PRA Budget Allocation to Service Delivery Regions (SDRs)
SDR Region
Proportion of Georgia Budget based on ($)
Percent difference
in budgetsUnemployed UI claimants Unemployed UI claimants
1 Northern Georgia 0.084 0.111 7,207,242 9,427,818 30.8
2 Northern Georgia 0.042 0.051 3,621,775 4,330,839 19.6
3 Atlanta 0.379 0.344 32,349,487 29,369,643 !9.2
4 Northern Georgia 0.060 0.066 5,099,734 5,665,896 11.1
5 Northern Georgia 0.047 0.050 4,005,444 4,287,221 7.0
6 Balance of Georgia 0.050 0.050 4,279,412 4,273,305 !0.1
7 Balance of Georgia 0.065 0.063 5,555,561 5,395,353 !2.9
8 Balance of Georgia 0.051 0.054 4,314,201 4,599,510 6.6
9 Balance of Georgia 0.049 0.045 4,218,304 3,850,765 !8.7
10 Balance of Georgia 0.059 0.053 5,055,091 4,552,948 !9.9
11 Coastal Georgia 0.059 0.061 4,991,047 5,215,258 4.5
12 Coastal Georgia 0.054 0.051 4,622,701 4,351,445 !5.9
State total 1.000 1.000 85,320,000 85,320,000
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Table 14 Service Delivery Region Top Percentages of Profiling Distribution to Receive
PRA Offers to Exhaust Budgets Based on the State-wide Profiling Distribution
Top percentage to enroll Total enrolled
SDR Total unemployed UI clients Total unemployed UI clients
1 31 41 2,494 3,199
2 32 36 1,294 1,501
3 19 17 11,577 10,332
4 30 33 1,958 2,126
5 30 32 1,404 1,506
6 30 30 1,480 1,480
7 30 29 1,945 1,883
8 29 31 1,625 1,714
9 41 37 1,360 1,229
10 29 24 1,585 1,396
11 36 38 1,570 1,636
12 27 25 1,523 1,426
Total 29,813 29,429
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Table 15 Service Delivery Region Top Percentages of Profiling Distribution to Receive
PRA Offer to Exhaust Budgets Based on the within-SDR Profiling Distribution
Top percentage to enroll Total enrolled
SDR Total unemployed UI clients Total unemployed UI clients
1 26 34 2,504 3,274
2 24 28 1,276 1,489
3 20 18 11,305 10,174
4 28 31 1,930 2,138
5 24 25 1,450 1,510
6 25 25 1,488 1,488
7 29 28 1,933 1,866
8 28 30 1,610 1,726
9 36 33 1,349 1,236
10 29 26 1,584 1,420
11 27 28 1,563 1,622
12 21 20 1,510 1,438
29,502 29,380
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Figure 1 Matrix of Costs and Benefits for PRA Participants
Employment Services
Period 1 Period 2
Benefits Costs Benefits Costs
Employed
(=1)
Yes
(=1)
x
w1
(b1 ! cs ! cT)
cz
cs
cT
w2
b2
cz
cs
cT
No 
(=0)
x
w1
b1
cz w2
b2
cz
Unemployed
(=0)
Yes
(=1)
x cz
cs
cT
x
w2
cz
cs
cT
No
(=0)
x cz x
w2
cz
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Figure 2 Employment Status in PRA Time Periods (Sample Share/Targeted Sample
Share)
Employed period 1—first 13 weeks
Employed period 2—after 13 weeks
Yes = 1 No = 0
Yes = 1 E11   (0.343/0.267) E10   (0.235/0.135)
No = 0 E01  (0.080/0.099) E00  (0.341/0.499)
Figure 3 Employment and Services Use Status in PRA Time Periods
Employed period 1—first 13 weeks
Employed period 2—after 13 weeks
Yes = 1 No = 0
Yes = 1
Services use if E11 Services use if E10
E11S11 E11S10 E10S11 E10S10
E11S01 E11S00 E10S01 E10S00
No = 0
Services use if E01 Services use if E00
E01S11 E01S10 E00S11 E00S10
E01S01 E01S00 E00S01 E00S00
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Appendix A
A Spreadsheet for Simulations of Alternative
Personal Reemployment Account Designs at the Sample Means
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Table A.1 PRA Simulation Based on Top 30 Percent According to New Profiling Model
(Items in Bold May be Changed to Compute Alternate Simulations )
Service
variable Description
Baseline
prices ($)
Enter
alternative ($) Change
i1 Service coordination 356 356 0
i2 Customer service plan 356 356 0
i3 In-depth assessment 712 712 0
i4 Counseling 712 712 0
i5 Expanded workshop 712 712 0
c18 Referred to supportive services 1,068 1,068 0
Training Training 1,424 1,424 0
PRA offer amount or WBA Multiple (*1) 3,000 3,000 0
Georgia PRA budget allocation amount 85,320,000 85,320,000 0
Simulation results: Baseline ($) Alternative ($) Change ($)
    Total cost per offer (no impact) 1,463 1,463 0
    Total cost per offer (1-week impact) 1,502 1,502 0
    Total cost per offer (2-week impact) 1,538 1,538 0
    Maximum offers (no impact) 58,317 58,317 0
    Maximum offers (1-week impact) 56,801 56,801 0
    Maximum offers (2-week impact) 55,467 55,467 0
(*1) When entering a dollar amount, minimum offer is $1,500 and maximum is $3,000. If amount entered does not fall
within that range, no simulation will be performed. If entering WBA multiple and resulting PRA offer does not fall
within that range, no simulation will be performed.
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Table A.2 Services Participation Rates and Other Data Needed for Simulations
Service categories and cost items E11S00
E11
S10
E11
S01
E11
S11
E10
S00
E10
S10
E10
S01
E10
S11
E01
S00
E01
S10
E01
S01
E01
S11
E00
S00
E00
S10
E00
S01
E00
S11
i1 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.020
i2 0.000 0.888 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.870 0.000 0.716 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.736 0.000 0.898
i3 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.019
i4 0.000 0.925 0.000 0.818 0.000 0.919 0.000 0.818 0.000 0.839 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.799 0.000 0.916
i5 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.004
c18 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.046
Training 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.121
Group proportion (no impact) 0.160 0.103 0.001 0.002 0.085 0.047 0.002 0.002 0.058 0.027 0.002 0.011 0.296 0.112 0.017 0.074
Group proportion (1-week impact) 0.167 0.107 0.001 0.003 0.089 0.050 0.002 0.002 0.051 0.024 0.001 0.011 0.291 0.109 0.017 0.074
Group proportion (2-week impact) 0.173 0.111 0.001 0.004 0.093 0.052 0.002 0.003 0.046 0.020 0.001 0.010 0.287 0.106 0.017 0.073
Group WBA (no impact) 269 259 259 264 265 248 256 241 267 259 260 261 266 259 263 255
Group WBA (1-week impact) 269 259 259 263 265 248 255 244 268 259 260 261 266 259 263 255
Group WBA (2-week impact) 269 259 255 266 265 248 254 245 268 259 264 260 266 260 263 255
Alternative group PRA offer amounts:
    No impact 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
    1-week impact 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
    2-week impact 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Baseline costs for group, 1st period
    Service costs, no impact 0 1,145 0 1,401 0 1,165 0 1,347 0 1,189 0 1,196 0 1,188 0 1,218
    Service costs, 1-week impact 0 1,145 0 1,401 0 1,165 0 1,347 0 1,189 0 1,196 0 1,188 0 1,218
    Service costs, 2-week impact 0 1,145 0 1,401 0 1,165 0 1,347 0 1,189 0 1,196 0 1,188 0 1,218
    1st bonus, no impact 1,800 1,113 1,800 959 1,800 1,101 1,800 992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    1st bonus, 1-week impact 1,800 1,113 1,800 959 1,800 1,101 1,800 992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    1st bonus, 2-week impact 1,800 1,113 1,800 959 1,800 1,101 1,800 992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alternative costs 1st period
    Service costs, no impact 0 1,145 0 1,401 0 1,165 0 1,347 0 1,189 0 1,196 0 1,188 0 1,218
    Service costs, 1-week impact 0 1,145 0 1,401 0 1,165 0 1,347 0 1,189 0 1,196 0 1,188 0 1,218
    Service costs, 2-week impact 0 1,145 0 1,401 0 1,165 0 1,347 0 1,189 0 1,196 0 1,188 0 1,218
    1st bonus, no impact 1,800 1,113 1,800 959 1,800 1,101 1,800 992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    1st bonus, 1-week impact 1,800 1,113 1,800 959 1,800 1,101 1,800 992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    1st bonus, 2-week impact 1,800 1,113 1,800 959 1,800 1,101 1,800 992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.3 Services Participation Rates AFTER First 13 Weeks, by Group
E11
S00
E11
S10
D11
S01
E11
S11
E10
S00
E10
S10
E10
S01
E10
S11
E01
S00
E01
S10
E01
S01
E01
S11
E00
S00
E00
S10
E00
S01
E00
S11
i1 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.012
i2 0.000 0.000 0.358 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.309 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.833 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.821
i3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.017
i4 0.000 0.000 0.358 0.609 0.000 0.000 0.395 0.636 0.000 0.000 0.292 0.886 0.000 0.000 0.334 0.857
i5 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.007
c18 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.123 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.236 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.036
Training 0.000 0.000 0.528 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.444 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.542 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.545 0.133
Baseline costs for group, 2nd period
    Service costs, no impact 0 0 1,200 639 0 0 1,200 661 0 0 1,343 1,112 0 0 1,330 1,153
    Service costs, 1-week impact 0 0 1,200 639 0 0 1,200 661 0 0 1,343 1,112 0 0 1,330 1,153
    Service costs, 2-week impact 0 0 1,200 639 0 0 1,200 661 0 0 1,343 1,112 0 0 1,330 1,153
    2nd bonus, no impact 1,200 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    2nd  bonus, 1-week impact 1,200 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    2nd bonus, 2-week impact 1,200 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alternative costs for group, 2nd period
    Service costs, no impact 0 0 1,200 639 0 0 1,200 661 0 0 1,343 1,112 0 0 1,330 1,153
    Service costs, 1-week impact 0 0 1,200 639 0 0 1,200 661 0 0 1,343 1,112 0 0 1,330 1,153
    Service costs, 2-week impact 0 0 1,200 639 0 0 1,200 661 0 0 1,343 1,112 0 0 1,330 1,153
    2nd bonus, no impact 1,200 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    2nd  bonus, 1-week impact 1,200 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    2nd bonus, 2-week impact 1,200 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total group PRA spending
    Baseline (no impact) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,800 2,266 3,000 3,000 0 1,189 1,343 2,308 0 1,188 1,330 2,371
    Baseline (1-week impact) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,800 2,266 3,000 3,000 0 1,189 1,343 2,308 0 1,188 1,330 2,371
    Baseline (2-week impact) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,800 2,266 3,000 3,000 0 1,189 1,343 2,308 0 1,188 1,330 2,371
    Alternative (no impact) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,800 2,266 3,000 3,000 0 1,189 1,343 2,308 0 1,188 1,330 2,371
    Alternative (1-week impact) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,800 2,266 3,000 3,000 0 1,189 1,343 2,308 0 1,188 1,330 2,371
    Alternative (2-week impact) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,800 2,266 3,000 3,000 0 1,189 1,343 2,308 0 1,188 1,330 2,371
Baseline cost (no impact) 480 309 3 7 153 106 5 6 0 33 2 26 0 133 23 176
Baseline cost (1-week impact) 501 321 4 9 161 112 5 7 0 28 2 25 0 130 23 175
Baseline cost (2-week impact) 518 332 4 11 168 119 6 9 0 24 2 23 0 126 23 173
Alternative cost (no impact) 480 309 3 7 153 106 5 6 0 33 2 26 0 133 23 176
Alternative cost (1-week impact) 501 321 4 9 161 112 5 7 0 28 2 25 0 130 23 175
Alternative cost (2-week impact) 518 332 4 11 168 119 6 9 0 24 2 23 0 126 23 173
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Table A.4  PRA Simulation Based on Top 30 Percent According to New Profiling
Model Alternative with Prices set at Half 
(Items in Bold May be Changed to Compute Alternate Simulations )
Service variable Description
Baseline
prices ($)
Enter
alternative ($) Change ($)
i1 Service coordination 356 178 !178
i2 Customer service plan 356 178 !178
i3 In-depth assessment 712 356 !356
i4 Counseling 712 356 !356
i5 Expanded workshop 712 356 !356
c18 Referred to supportive services 1,068 534 !534
Training Training 1,424 712 !712
PRA offer amount or WBA Multiple (*1) 3,000 3,000 0
Georgia PRA budget allocation amount 85,320,000 85,320,000 0
Simulation results: Baseline ($) Alternative Change
    Total cost per offer (no impact) 1,463 1,253 !210
    Total cost per offer (1-week impact) 1,502 1,296 !206
    Total cost per offer (2-week impact) 1,538 1,337 !202
    Maximum offers (no impact) 58,317 68,111 9,794
    Maximum offers (1-week impact) 56,801 65,841 9,039
    Maximum offers (2-week impact) 55,467 63,833 8,366
(*1) When entering a dollar amount, minimum offer is $1500 and maximum is $3000. If amount entered does not fall
within that range, no simulation will be performed. If entering WBA multiple and resulting PRA offer does not fall
within that range, no simulation will be performed.
53
References
Blank, Rebecca, and David Card. 1991. “Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment:
Is There and Explanation?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (4): 1157–1189. 
Decker, Paul T., Christopher J. O’Leary, and Stephen A. Woodbury. 2001. “Impacts on
Employment and Earnings.” In Reemployment Bonuses in the Unemployment Insurance
System: Evidence from Three Field Experiments, Philip K. Robins and Robert G.
Spiegelman, eds.  Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp:
151–174.
Decker, Paul T., and Irma Perez-Johnson. 2004. “Individual Training Accounts.” In Job Training
Policy in the United States, Christopher J. O’Leary, Robert A. Straits, and Stephen A.
Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Eberts, Randall W., and Christopher J. O’Leary. 2002. “A Frontline Decision Support System for
Georgia Career Centers.” Upjohn Institute working paper 02-84. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Executive Office of the President, Council of Economic Advisers. 2003. Economic Report of the
President. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Lawrence, John K. 2003. “Georgia Share of PRA,” February 3, 2003 memorandum to Milton Martin
and Helen Parker from the Deputy Director of Workforce Information and Analysis
Division.  Atlanta: Georgia Department of Labor. 
Leigh, Duane E. 1995. Assisting Workers Displaced by Structural Change: An International
Perspective. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Meyer, Bruce D. 1995. “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance  Experiments.” Journal
of Economic Literature 33(1): 91–131.
O’Leary, Christopher J. 2004. “Effectiveness of Labor Exchange Services.” In Labor Exchange
Policy in the United States, David E. Balducchi, Randall W. Eberts, and Christopher J.
O’Leary, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp.
135–177.
O’Leary, Christopher J., Paul T. Decker, and Stephen A. Wandner. Forthcoming. “Cost-
Effectiveness of Targeted Reemployment Bonuses.” Journal of Human Resources. 
Robins, Philip K., and Robert G. Spiegelman, eds. 2001. Reemployment Bonuses in the
Unemployment Insurance System: Evidence from Three Field Experiments. Kalamazoo, MI:
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.  
54
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Robert G. Spiegelman. 1987. “Bonuses to Workers and Employers to
Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois.” American Economic Review 77 (4):
513–530.  
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Murray Rubin. 1997. “ The Duration of Benefits.” In Unemployment
Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. O’Leary and
Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
pp: 211–283.
